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Articles

Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform Has
Lagged in New York
J. Herbie DiFonzo
Ruth C. Stern*
Introduction
From 1787 until the latter half of the 20th century, New
Yorkers chafed, strained and schemed against the most restrictive of this country's divorce laws. Alone among the fifty states,
New York permitted divorce on the sole ground of adultery.'
Characterized as an "absurd anachronism," 2 this stance was
particularly puzzling in light of New York's acknowledged leadership in social reform legislation.
Despite such rigorous legal constraint, for 180 years New
Yorkers contrived to dispose of their spouses with great frequency. Marital dissolution was achieved through the
processes of annulment, migratory divorce, and fraudulent
adultery proceedings. Advocates for reform repeatedly urged
strong doses of reality on their legislators, recognizing that "a
statute designed to prevent divorce in New York did not sup* J. Herbie DiFonzo is Professor of Law and Director, LL.M. Program in Family Law, Hofstra University Law School, lawjhd@hofstra.edu. Ruth C. Stern is an
attorney and former Coordinator of Family Law Programs at Hofstra University
Law School, branwel1226@msn.com.
1. Even South Carolina, which for most of its history, disallowed divorce completely (except for a brief period during Reconstruction), had liberalized its divorce
grounds by 1948. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J.
875, 917-20 (2000) (describing South Carolina divorce reform history).
2. Howard Hilton Spellman, Chairman, Address Before the New York Joint
Legislature Committee on Matrimonial and Family Law (Jan. 1966), in 21 REc. OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 35, at 38 [hereinafter Committee Report].
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press the desire of New Yorkers for divorce." 3 Indeed, the issue
of divorce engendered enormous controversy in New York, per4
haps as much as or more so than in any other jurisdiction.
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, marital dissolution
was strenuously debated but was, until relatively recently,
stubbornly resistant to reform.
It is tempting to attribute this glacial rate of change to the
power of New York's religious and conservative interest groups.
But, while New York's population has, historically, been heavily
Catholic, so have the populations of Massachusetts, Illinois and
Pennsylvania, all of which exceed New York in recorded rates of
divorce. 5 And, while New York's conservatives have staunchly
and stridently decried the immorality of divorce, the trend toward marital breakup has, nevertheless, kept pace with their
disfavor. Just as Prohibition gave rise to a spectacular era of
excess, strictures against divorce have inspired corruption, evasion and myriad ways to subvert the law. In a way, New
Yorkers became the victims of their own ingenuity. Had they
been less successful in finding ways to exit the state of matrimony, they might have aroused greater public pressure for reform. As it was, legislators were able to achieve a pretense of
moral probity by resisting reform. By dodging the issue, they
insulated themselves from social controversy. And, in so doing,
they perpetuated a law which "satisfied those who wanted a deterrent to divorce, recognition of the sanctity of marriage, and
the preservation of the traditional norms of the nuclear family."6 Thus, a population determined to consistently and creatively evade the law achieved a peculiar stasis with those who
steadfastly refused to change it. The availability of out-of-state
divorces provided a "safety valve" which "encouraged the reten7
tion of rigid legislation in conservative states like New York."
Judges responded to the law's severity by interpreting it liberally and permissively.8 Equal and opposing forces produced a
3. Isabel Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections on the History of Divorce Law Reform in New York State, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 375, 421 (1988).
4. PAUL H. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 114 (1959).
5. Id. at 117.
6. Marcus, supra note 3, at 417 n.159.
7. Id. at 422.
8. MAx RHEINSTEIN, MARITAL STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 365 (1972).
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deadlock that kept New York's divorce reform in a state of
paralysis.
During this 180 year period, divorce reform by no means
retreated into silence and invisibility. It was, however, largely
ineffective. Not until the 1960s would a series of events conspire to bring the conservative-liberal standstill to an end.
While the reform was justly hailed as a deliverance from bad
law, it was motivated less by a crusade for justice than by weariness and disgust with the corrupt administration of the divorce statutes.
Never having banished fault from its moral and legal consciousness, New York remains dependent upon it as a rationale
for framing and resolving marital dissolution issues. Fault continues to pervade analysis of property distribution and spousal
support matters. It has even achieved a certain strategic legitimacy in the eyes of those who currently oppose measures to
evict fault entirely from New York's divorce law. Perhaps fault
has become permanently rooted in the state's way of thinking
about divorce. Or, perhaps it is viewed by some as a shield
against property distribution and support statutes which fail to
prevent economic inequity and injustice.
Archaic and divisive as the fault concept seems, removing it
from the statutes will not remedy all conflict and unfairness
emanating from divorce. The potential for economic strife persists whether or not the break-up is grounded in fault. Unless
New York is prepared to accommodate the legitimate need for
financial justice between the parties, the most crucial aspects of
divorce will continue to elude the state's efforts at reform. Until
it feels secure in withdrawing its reliance on it, the Empire
State will remain addicted to fault.
In the succeeding pages, we summarize New York's history
of divorce legislation and analyze the forces that, for such a prolonged period, kept reform at bay. In Part I we describe the
halting development of divorce law from the 18th to the end of
the 19th century. Part II focuses on the first half of the 20th
century and the continuing, mostly futile, efforts to liberalize
divorce law. Part III examines the ways in which New Yorkers
succeeded in dissolving their marriages on their own terms, despite the strictures of the law. In Part IV, we explore the social
climate and chain of events that allowed divorce reform finally
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to occur in the 1960s. Part V discusses the 1980 enactment of
an Equitable Distribution Law and its connection to the question of marital fault. In Part VI, we consider the prospects for
achieving true no-fault divorce, and conclude that reform of the
grounds of divorce is dependent on further reform of divorce finances, particularly a more equitable determination of spousal
maintenance.
I.

Reform Deferred: New York Divorce Law from
1787 to 1900

In 19th century New York, there was no shortage of highflown sentiment on the subject of marriage and divorce. At the
New York Tribune, Horace Greeley, editor and moral conservative extraordinaire, conducted spirited dialogues in his newspaper on the sanctity of the marital bond. While he argued
vigorously against marital dissolution, others would sooner "elevate marriage by excluding from its benefits those who [would]
dishonor[] it." 9 For the feminists, although not united on the
issue, 10 divorce was high on the agenda of the Woman's Rights
Convention, held in New York City in 1860. And, while
profound philosophical differences existed between 19th century liberals and conservatives, each side claimed superior wisdom on how best to preserve the marital institution." In the
end, whether in favor of expanding divorce grounds or strenuously opposed, both sides came to "similar self-serving conclusions"' 2 and little was accomplished in the way of reform.
A notable exception was the Married Women's Property Act
of 1848 and its 1860 Amendments. The law permitted women
to own property and businesses, separate and apart from their
husbands, to contract with respect to business and to keep their
own earnings. Initially, the statute's impact was limited to.
wealthier women, 13 as a means of protecting their property from
the creditors of spendthrift husbands. 4 The reforms were not
9. NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD
10. Id. at 93.
11. Marcus, supra note 3, at 420.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 403.
14. Id. at 402.

TO RENO

85 (1962).
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intended to "degender access to property," 15 and did not significantly transform "traditional marriage patterns."1 6 In later decades, however, the increasing economic independence achieved
by women would give valuable impetus to their demand for
17
equality.
The law of divorce and the Married Women's Property Acts
did not develop conjointly. Notwithstanding their separate conceptual paths, the prospect of economic independence had "important symbolic and practical consequences" 8 on women's
views of marriage. Divorce, so stigmatizing and so rarely available, was no longer a prerequisite to a married woman's physical and economic emancipation. 19 In addition to allowing for the
possibility of a separate income and, thus, "a small escape hatch
from oppressive marriages for some women," 20 the Married Women's Property Acts established a new legal category of property. Formerly, "family" property consisted solely of the
husband's holdings. Thereafter, all subsequent evolution of
New York's divorce law had to take the wife's property into ac21
count as well.
To the detriment of both men and women seeking to evade
bad marriages, the concept of fault became an integral part of
the struggle. Throughout our history, the family unit has been
a cornerstone of American society. The specter of divorce invited threats to those most fundamental values vital to society's
preservation. As a result, "it is not surprising that, as a matter
of public policy, marriage was viewed historically as either indissoluble or dissoluble only under very limited circumstances. '22 As actions for divorce involved dissection of the
guilty party's moral conduct, the notion of fault became "essential to the dissolution process." 23 Nowhere did this concept take
root more permanently than in New York.
15. Id. at 399.
16. Id. at 401.
17. HERBERT JACOB,

SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 111 (1988).

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 110-11.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id.
Marcus, supra note 3, at 415.
Id. at 415-16.
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The law of divorce in New York began in 1787 with a bill
proposed by Alexander Hamilton. 24 Acting as chair of a special
committee, Hamilton urged the creation of a judicial process to
consider matters of divorce. At that time, the power to grant
such relief resided in the legislature with no provision for a trial
on the facts. 25 As enacted, New York's first general divorce law
permitted judicial divorce on the sole ground of adultery and
prohibited the guilty spouse from remarrying. 26 This latter provision was opposed by the Council on Revision as unduly harsh
and unrealistic. The legislature overrode the Council's veto,
and not until 1879 would New York lift its ban against adulter27
ous spouses remarrying.
New York's single-ground, fault-based divorce law remained virtually immune to revision until well into the 20th
century. By the advent of the Civil War, "most of the other
states liberalized their divorce codes to include physical and
28
mental cruelty among other grounds for ending a marriage."
In New York, attempts to reform the law by broadening the
grounds for divorce were defeated in 1813, 1827, 1840, 1849,
1850 and 1855.29 A slight modification, issued in 1813, allowed
the court to grant judicial separation on the ground of cruel and
inhumane treatment. This remedy, at first available only to
women, was made obtainable by husbands as well in 1824.30
Legislative efforts to include divorce grounds for desertion
(1813) and habitual drunkenness (1827) both failed. By 1830,
however, the legislature for the first time defined five grounds
for annulment: being under the age of consent, bigamy, lunacy
31
and idiocy, force or fraud and physical incapacity (impotence).
Throughout the first half of the 19th century, the legislature received numerous requests for private divorce bills. An
24. 1787 N.Y. Laws ch. 69.
25. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 64-65. During the colonial period divorces were
extremely rare in New York and only available by special action of the governor or
state legislature. See id. at 41-45; HENRY FOSTER & DORIS FREED, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND ANNULMENT 256-57 n.11 (rev. ed. 1972).
26. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 256.
27. Id. at 256 n.9; see BLAKE, supra note 9, at 65.
28. JACOB, supra note 17, at 30.
29. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 261.
30. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 66.
31. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 261-62, n.20; BLAKE, supra note 9, at

66-67.
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1840 assembly committee on grievances criticized this course of
legislating for specific individuals and urged the adoption of ex32
panded judicial divorce grounds.
It further condemned judicial separation (which, as it was
not a dissolution, did not permit either party to remarry) as
openly inviting immorality. 33 These efforts were unsuccessful,
as were proposals in 1849 to add four additional divorce
grounds: willful desertion for five years, three years' imprisonment, habitual drunkenness and incurable insanity. 3 4 Further
attempts to abolish judicial separation and extend the divorce
grounds were made in 1850 and 1855, to no avail. 35 Legislative
divorce was constitutionally abolished in 1846, although the occasional special bill continued to allow for circumvention of New
York's rigid law. 36 Between 1811 and 1903, several private divorce bills were based on grounds not available in the general
37
statute, such as cruelty and abandonment.
These "swirls of legislative activity"38 were often accompanied by lively public discussion. During 1852-53 the pages of
the New York Tribune resounded with vigorous debate, principally between Horace Greeley, the Tribune's editor, and Henry
James Sr., father of the novelist Henry James and the philosopher and psychologist William James. While declaiming admiration for the divine, exalted character of marriage, James, who
supported greater legitimization of divorce, averred that "marriage is very badly administered at present."39 Greeley opposed
liberalization of divorce as against state interest and feared it
would result in "general profligacy and corruption."4 0 Greeley
carried his crusade up to the Civil War and beyond, sparring in
the pages of the Tribune with, among others, Robert Dale
Owen, an advocate of radical reform and son of a utopian socialist. As James, Owen, and other proponents of divorce reform
32.
33.
n.20.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

BLAKE, supra note 9, at 76; RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 38.
BLAKE, supra note 9, at 76; FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 261-62
BLAKE, supra note 9, at 76-77.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 75.
JACOBSON, supra note, 4 at 115; see also BLAKE, supra note 9, at 67-76.
Marcus, supra note 3, at 417.
BLAKE, supra note 9, at 83.
Id. at 84.
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discovered, "one of the best devices for focusing attention on the
'4 1
divorce question was to provoke Horace Greeley into debate."
Although generally sympathetic to most feminist concerns,
Greeley regarded Elizabeth Cady Stanton's notion of non-binding marriage as "simply shocking." 42 Stanton, terming indissoluble marriage an absurdity, referred to the suicides of unhappy
wives as well as their murders and wondered whether "all these
wretched matches are made in heaven? That all these sad, miserable people are bound together by God?" 43 In 1861, Stanton
addressed New York's Senate Judiciary Committee on the
plight of married women in the 19th century. Although the
committee applauded her eloquence, she could not rescue the
44
proposed liberalized divorce bill from defeat.
Following the Civil War, New York's divorce law changed
little, and, for those seeking escape from marriage, generally for
the worse. Driven by the force of a strong conservative backlash, the legislature worked at devising further obstacles to
marital dissolution. In 1877, courts were authorized to deny divorce, even where adultery had been proven, if the plaintiff had
connived in the procurement of evidence, condoned the offense,
or was guilty of the same misconduct. 45 Measures passed in
1899 mandated stricter proof of adultery and, in 1902, the legislature imposed a three-month waiting period between the
46
granting of a divorce and issuance of the final decree.
Nineteenth century feminists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, as well as other social reformers, did
much to propel the issue of divorce into the forum of public discourse. But the debate between liberal reformers and their conservative opponents only served to immure each side within its
own rhetoric: "Each proclaimed with equal fervor that domestic
41. Id. at 110.
42. Id. at 95.
43. Id. at 93 (quoting ELIZABETH CADY STANTON ET AL., History of Women's
Suffrage I 720 (1881)).
44. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 95. Known as the Ramsey Bill, the proposed legislation attempted to revive the issue defeated the previous year, of adding desertion, cruelty and drunkenness as grounds for divorce.
45. 1877 N.Y. Laws ch. 1168; see also BLAKE, supra note 9, at 200; see J.
HERBIE DiFoNzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 55-57 (1997) (discussing the historical
rationale for recrimination, connivance, and collusion).
46. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 200.
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felicity and purity, matrimonial concord, virtue, and unblemished morals would be fostered and preserved by their respective proposals."47 Despite such fervor, 19th century New York
remained unable to advance beyond the debate and into legislative action. Divorce reform would have to wait for more than
sixty years.
II.

Reform Deferred (Again): 1900-1960

Nelson Blake has suggested that the stubborn adhesion of
New York's lawmakers to one-ground divorce reflected "not so
much a stern sense of duty as an inability to give the problem of
marital law more than fitful attention."48 Distracted and obstructed by social and religious forces, legislators marched feebly in place. By the turn of the century, conservative pressures
continued to mount, 49 and New York became the center of the
anti-divorce movement. 50 Progressive Era advocates of all manner of freedoms-political, intellectual, economic, religious and
sexual-co-existed with believers in strong moral and Christian
traditions. 51 While freethinkers and libertarians were clamoring for free love and easy divorce, conservatives were constructing obscenity laws and laying the groundwork for Prohibition. 52
By the late 19th century, New Yorkers were well-acquainted with the fact that other jurisdictions offered easier access to marital dissolution. The practice of traveling to another
state to establish residency and procure a divorce came to be
known as "migratory divorce." 53 Alarmed by the prevalence of
disgruntled spouses taking wing for more legally hospitable
habitats, New York initiated the creation of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 54 Composed
of delegates of the states, the power of the Conference to unify
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Marcus, supra note 3, at 420.
BLAKE, supra note 9, at 64.
Marcus, supra note 3, at 423-24.
RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 47.
Id. at 49. See generally WILLLAM L. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE

ERA (1967).
52. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 48-49.
53. See discussion infra Section III.
54. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 47.
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the laws of marriage and divorce, despite many decades and
55
several proposed Acts, proved "negligible."
In the early part of the 20th century, the new science of
sociology, along with its "cadre of experts on the family,"56 began to invade the province of divorce reform. In their zeal to
improve the living and working conditions of the poor, however,
social reformers came to advocate an increasingly paternalistic
role for the state. The notions of the Progressive era "all but
flew out the window" as reformers, previously opposed to conservative divorce restrictions, outlined "similar programs for
marital restrictions." 57 Paradoxically, too, the relatively high
post-World War I divorce rate did not portend a new era of social and economic freedom for women. 58 Despite modest wartime gains in the labor force, the armistice brought "large-scale
regression," 59 and the promise of economic independence for women proved largely illusory. Nor did the image of the 1920s
footloose flapper liberate most women from traditional roles. F.
Scott Fitzgerald and his Jazz Age contemporaries dismissed
housework as mind-deadening drudgery. Yet, as many working
women learned, housework did not yield to outside employment. In the marital home, the "new woman" continued to "perform the old tasks."60
This climate of social ambivalence was, clearly, not conducive to reform. Not surprisingly, during this era, New York's
legislature "never mustered its courage for a frontal attack on
the divorce problem." 61 Between the years of 1900 and 1933,
fifteen different legislators sponsored bills to modernize the law
by adding divorce grounds such as cruelty and desertion. 62 Almost without exception, these bills were "buried in committee." 63 The so-called Enoch Arden law, enacted in 1922,
studiously avoided the term "divorce" but authorized a decree of
55. Id.
56. LYNNE

CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL

PERSPECTIVES 67 (1980).

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 71.
JACOBSON, supra note 4,
DiFoszo, supra note 45,

at 92.
at 20.

Id. at 21.
BLAKE, supra note 9, at 201.
Id.
Id.
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presumed death where spouses were missing or not heard from
64
for five years.
New York City Democratic lawmakers did actively support
reform but, due to an apportionment of representation that discriminated against their city, they rarely controlled the legislature. 65 Furthermore, because of party dependence on the
Catholic vote, Democrats often avoided controversial divorce issues. 66 After 1933, Republicans, far less dependent on Catholic
support, were not so averse to running the political risks involved in promoting divorce reform. 67 Yet, as the divorce question remained a matter of fervent dispute, even the Republicans
"preferred to duck the issue." 68
During the depression, the divorce rate slowed but desertions "skyrocketed."69 In 1934, a Republican New York City assemblyman, I. Arnold Ross, proposed a bill to add a new divorce
ground of desertion. In his district Ross had been moved by
"the plight of deserted wives unable to get divorces in New York
unless they resorted to fraud and too poor to establish residences in other states." 70 Catholic opposition to the bill, led by
Charles J. Tobin, Secretary of the New York State Catholic Welfare Committee, was loud, energetic and immediate. 7 1 Despite
the strong support of various bar associations and other religious organizations, the bill was defeated. For the next twenty
years, the Catholic Church would prove a formidable opponent
64. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §§ 220, 221 (1922); see BLAKE, supra note 9, at 199.
Enoch Arden is the eponymous hero of a poem by Alfred Lord Tennyson. A "rough
sailor's lad/Made orphan by a winter shipwreck." Enoch goes to sea to provide for
his wife, Annie, and their children. He survives a shipwreck but remains missing
for ten years. When he returns, he discovers that his wife is happily married to
their childhood friend, Philip Ray, and has borne a child by him. Enoch silently
suffers the pain of watching another man raise his children, and keeps his identity
a secret. In his last hours, he begs a friend to tell his wife and children that he
died with a blessing on his lips for them and to "say to Philip that I blest him too;
He never meant us any thing but good." ALFRED TENNYSON, ENOCH ARDEN, AND
OTHER POEMS (1864), available at http://whitewolf.newcastle.edu.au/words/authorsTfrTennysonAlfred/verse/enochardenlenocharden.html.
65. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 203.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
DIFoNzo, supra note 45, at 30.
BLAKE, supra note 9, at 204.
Id. at 206.
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of divorce reform. As soon as a bill to liberalize divorce appeared before the New York legislature, a Catholic Welfare
League representative would contact lawmakers to remind
72
them that the church was opposed.
After World War II, the country's divorce rate soared to
previously unimagined heights. The postwar disruption to marital life "resulted in intolerable pressures against the flimsy
dikes of the New York family laws." 73 In 1945, the Committee
of Law Reform of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York urged liberalization of the divorce law. A bill recommending six new grounds for divorce died in committee three
years later.7 4 From 1949 to 1956, Assemblywoman Janet Hill
Gordon fought persistently to form a legislative commission to
study the divorce laws. When, finally, the commission was created in 1956, its power was limited and it lacked authority to
75
recommend expansion of divorce grounds.
At mid-20th century, the legacy of Alexander Hamilton was
proving indestructible, buttressed by powerful Catholics, moralizing conservatives, paternalistic post-Progressive liberals, and
faint-hearted politicians. What Mr. Hamilton might not have
predicted was that, for much of its existence, his law would be
continually subverted and circumvented. Despite, and because
of, the law's unyielding regimen, New Yorkers would find a way
to satisfy their appetite for divorce.
III.

Fraud, Corruption, and End-Runs Round the Law

Had New York truly craved a strict, orderly enforcement of
its one-ground, fault-based divorce code, it would have killed all
the lawyers. Rather than inhibiting divorce, the law produced a
thriving trade of practitioners, specializing in divorce and acting in "cheerful disregard of legal ethics." 76 In 1869 the New
York Times reported:
The husband or wife who wishes to get rid of a disagreeable partner has only to go to some sharper calling himself an attorney,
who advertises his readiness to get divorces without publicity,
72. JACOB, supra note 17, at 35-36.
73. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 211.
74. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 261-62, n.20.
75. Id.
76. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 190.
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and who at once undertakes to do all the dirty work incidental to
the case. If there is no evidence he forges or invents as much as
he wants. If the man or woman against whom he is employed is
innocent, he finds someone to lay all sorts of crimes to their
77
charge.
These attorneys plied their trade, often in well-appointed
offices, along lower Manhattan. 78 In 1870, the Times exposed
the details of these divorce ring operations. Lawyers "shrewdly
calculated whether to bring suit in New York" or another state,
79
customizing the charges and allegations to fit the jurisdiction.
For nearly a century, New York played host to divorce mills rife
with scandal, professional perjurers and the manufacture of
fraudulent divorce decrees.8 0 Especially active was the industry
of lawyers and laypersons catering to litigants in adultery proceedings. So widespread were these actions that the "number of
identified adulterers reached Sodomite levels during the period
prior to 1967, apparently indicating both total decay of the
moral fiber and extreme clumsiness in the execution of evil intentions."8 ' For a fee, the system furnished fabricated evidence
as well as the services of a witness and correspondent. In 1934,
the New York Mirror created a sensation with its series, "I Was
the 'Unknown Blonde' in 100 New York Divorces!"8 2 As described, the procedure called for "the husband to be caught in
the act of sitting beside a scantily clad correspondent when the
wife, a process server, and a private detective.., burst into the
hotel room."8 3 The participants then performed their scripted
roles in the courtroom in a hearing so routine that the referee
84
followed a "mimeographed list of questions."
In December, 1948, the New York Journal-Americanran
another expose of the city's divorce rings. The ensuing investigation by District Attorney Frank S. Hogan resulted in ten ar77. Id. (quoting Divorce Made Easy, N.Y.
78. Id.
79. Id.

TIMES,

Oct. 10, 1869).

80. Id. at 191-92.

81. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Cruelty Divorce Under New York's Reform Act: On Repeating Ancient Error,23 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 8 (1973-1974).
82. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 193.
83. DIFoNzo, supra note 45, at 89.
84. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 193.
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rests and the review of over 600 recent divorce cases.8 5 The
investigation's impact was "immediate and pronounced," cutting the number of divorce decrees issued in New York in 1949
by one third.8 6 But the cavalcade of fraudulently-obtained divorces resumed soon after, and the rare judge who refused to
accept the faked hotel evidence would "not be long hearing di87
vorce cases."
Since the 19th century, conservative opponents of divorce
reform had hailed New York as a "model state."8 8 But the
state's stringent rules were bound to inspire the creation of mitigating practices designed to provide relief.8 9 Two "evasive devices" were commonly used: migratory divorce and
annulments. 90 New Yorkers in significant numbers were willing to leave home in order to procure divorces. Several states,
depending on grounds and residency requirements, became popular as "divorce havens."9 1 Before 1840, Pennsylvania and Vermont fulfilled this role, while western states were frequent
destinations thereafter. 92 By 1870, "it was estimated that onequarter of all divorce decrees issued in Illinois and one-sixth of
those in Connecticut were arranged through New York law offices." 93 Jurisdictions began to compete for the interstate divorce trade by offering short residency requirements, notably
Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada and Texas. 94 In 1922, it was posited
that nearly one-third of all New York divorces had been obtained out of state. 95 Nevada, enthusiastically embracing the
divorce business, was issuing 1,000 divorces a year by the
1920s. 96 In 1931, when the residency requirement was reduced
85. Id. at 213.
86. JACOBSON, supra note 4, at 115.
87. Max Rheinstein, Our Dual Law of Divorce: The Law in Action Versus the
Law of the Books, in The Law School, The University of Chicago, Conference on
Divorce 41 (1952).
88. Marcus, supra note 3, at 421.
89. Teitelbaum, supra note 81, at 4-5.
90. JACOB, supra note 17, at 34-35.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 259-60.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
JACOBSON, supra note 4, at 116.

96. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 158.
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from three months to six weeks, Nevada's annual output soared
97
to 5,260.
Compelled by constitutional full faith and credit requirements, New York courts accepted out-of-state divorces where
both parties had been present. 98 In ex parte proceedings, New
York courts appeared "readier than most" to apply liberal rules
of estoppel, barring the absent spouse from prevailing on jurisdictional grounds. 99 The result was that "a considerable number of defective sister state divorces were sustained without
need for inquiry into the jurisdictional claims upon which they
rested." 0 0
Americans intent on shedding their spouses were also quite
willing to leave the country in order to do so. In the 1920s,
France and Havana were popular havens and, later, the Virgin
Islands and Mexico.' 0 ' Mexican divorces were accepted in some
states but not others. In 1952, one New York court declared
valid a Mexican divorce where one party appeared personally
10 2
and the other was merely represented by counsel.
In 1965, the New York Court of Appeals upheld two "classic
Mexican divorces" 0 3 in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel. 0 4 Essentially,
the court held that recognizing the foreign decrees offended no
state policy. 10 5 It also noted that, in the previous 25 years, no
"New York decision has refused to recognize such a bilateral
Mexican divorce." 0 6 Lee Teitelbaum pointed out that the court
could have limited rejection of Mexican divorces to those made
prospectively, thereby avoiding harm to those already relying
on previously-issued Mexican divorces. 10 7 Furthermore, the
court found no reason to discriminate against Mexican divorces
in light of its having recognized bilateral Nevada divorces based
on a scant six weeks' residence, often accompanied by fraudu97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Leviton v. Leviton, 6 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 4 N.Y.S.2d
992 (App. Div. 1938); see also Teitelbaum, supra note 81, at 5-6.
99. Teitelbaum, supra note 81, at 5.
100. Id.
101. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 261.
102. Caswell v. Caswell, 111 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
103. Teitelbaum, supra note 81, at 5.
104. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1965).
105. Id. at 712.
106. Id. at 710-11.
107. Teitelbaum, supra note 81, at 6.
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lent representations as to domiciliary intent.10 8 Teitelbaum
found less than persuasive the court's logic of "inviting a type of
evil that need not be suffered because one must tolerate an evil
that cannot be avoided." 10 9 He concluded that the Rosenstiel decision is comprehensible only as a repudiation of divorce laws
that no longer comported with the realities of actual divorce
practices. 110 As Max Rheinstein saw it, "The law of the books
was buried for all those who were willing to go on a one-day
round-trip flight to El Paso-Ciudad Juarez.""'
Migratory divorce especially appealed to the wealthy. For
112
others, less affluent, or with no stomach for "hotel perjury,"
annulments provided another evasive route. Allegations of
fraud and misrepresentation proved so varied and pliable that
they succeeded in spawning one hundred and fifty grounds for
annulment in New York. 113 At their peak, in 1946, annulments
represented 3.5 percent of the country's dissolution rate. 114 In
New York, annulments accounted for one-quarter of dissolutions during World War II and two-fifths after 1950.115 New
York had the nation's highest annulment rate, comprising possibly one-third of all those in the United States. 116 The paradox,
Blake notes, "was obvious. When called 'divorce' the dissolution
of marriage was still limited to the narrowest grounds. When
108. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d at 712.
109. Teitelbaum, supra note 81, at 6.
110. Id. The Court of Appeals highlighted the artifice at the heart of the Mexican divorces for New Yorkers, but it still allowed public interest to be shaped by
public demand:
The State or country of true domicile has the closest real public interest in a
marriage but, where a New York spouse goes elsewhere to establish a synthetic domicile to meet technical acceptance of a matrimonial suit, our public interest is not affected differently by a formality of one day than by a
formality of six weeks.
Nevada gets no closer to the real public concern with the marriage than
Chihuahua.
Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d at 712.
111. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 91.
112. DiFonzo, supra note 45, at 90.

113. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 196-97 (citing JOSEPH R. CLEVENGER, ANNULMENTS OF MARRIAGE: BEING A TREATISE COVERING NEW YORK LAW AND PRACTICE
WITH COMPOSITE FORMS 27 (1946)).
114. JACOBSON, supra note 4, at 113.

115. Id.
116. JACOB, supra note 17, at 35.
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called by any other name, marriage dissolution was regarded
with easygoing tolerance. 11 7 Even the clergy, vocal enough on
the issue of divorce yet curiously silent on the subject of annul8
ments, appeared to offer "tacit approval.""1
Shadowing this pageant of annulments, migrations, fraud
and perjury was the more somber trail of desertions and separations. New York's denial of "a civilized procedure for the termination of defunct marriages" 119 produced a substratum of the
quietly desperate. Those who were financially equipped to litigate or travel had one law, while the poor had none. 20 Many of
these individuals resorted to "self-help"' 2' and informally separated. Whether permanent or temporary, by private agreement
or by abandonment and desertion, separations occurred frequently. 22 In 1940, the proportion of white women who had
ever been married (excluding widows) and reported to be living
apart from their husbands was one-third greater in New York
than in the entire country. 123 Deserted spouses, often left to
cope with family responsibilities, placed a significant burden on
24
public and private welfare agencies.
For a good many New Yorkers, even those of more modest
means, divorce remained very much within the realm of possibility. By mid-20th century, the vast majority of divorce actions
were uncontested and, with nothing to challenge or litigate, legal costs were relatively low. In the process, judges and their
"judge-made law" 125 promoted a kind of social equality: "It is,
perhaps, a judicial awareness of the ease with which quick solutions to marital complexities are available to those able to pay
for them, and a judicial sense of fairness, that has caused our
117. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 198-99.
118. HALEM, supra note 56, at 255. It is possible that the Catholic Church

found it difficult to criticize civil annulment, as the Church had its own, quite similar, procedure. See FULTON J. SHEEN, Preface to the Second Edition of NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE (2d ed. 1959) (acknowledging the similarities between New York's civil
annulment process and the ecclesiastical procedures to declare a marriage null).
119. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 255.
120. Teitelbaum, supra note 81, at 10.
121. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 255.
122. JACOBSON, supra note 4, at 117.
123. Id.
124. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 202.

125. Richard Wels, New York: The Poor Man's Reno, 35
316 (1949-1950).

CORNELL

L.

Q. 303,
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judges to turn New York into a poor man's Reno for all with
sufficiently elastic consciences."126
On the books, New York's law created serious impediments
to divorce. Courts, meanwhile, were busily diverting the course
of marital dissolution to keep it flowing. Out of state bilateral
divorces achieved easy recognition while annulments abounded.
That formal divorce reform had failed to evolve did not preclude
a liberal interpretation and application of the law. 127 More than
96 percent of marital dissolution cases were uncontested, often
heard by referees. 28 Their findings were generally accepted by
the courts, most often without review. 29 Thus, while New
York, by statute, was the nation's premier anti-divorce state,
statistics told a quite different tale. By the 1950s, New York
had the lowest recorded divorce rate in the country. 3 0 But the
incidence of annulments, migratory divorce, along with separations and desertions, combined to raise New York's total rate of
marital disruption well above the national average.' 31 In the
1960s, this dichotomy between "law-as-statute and law-in-action" 3 2 would finally prove too much, even for the New York
legislature.
IV.

Reform Arrives

Alexander Hamilton's eighteenth century "relic" 133 was not
brought down by radical, feminist, or counter-culturalist
causes. 34 In the mid-1960s, the modern feminist movement
was in its early stages. Those who were engaged in seeking and
practicing alternative lifestyles were not concerned with fixing
the divorce problem. 35 And, although the public seemed to
favor reform, 136 there was no identifiable popular movement
that emerged to do battle with the old law.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 315.
JACOBSON, supra note 4, at 115.
FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25,
JACOBSON, supra note 4, at 115.

at 251.

Id. at 118.
Id.
Marcus, supra note 3, at 423.
RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 256.
JACOB, supra note 17, at 33.
Id.
FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 264.
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The public had grown aware, however, of the schism between "formal law" (the divorce code) and "law in action" (contemporary divorce practices). 137 Not only did these entities
scarcely resemble each other, but the "latter was frankly engaged in nullifying the former." 138 For years this dichotomy had
masqueraded, quite successfully, as compromise. Conservatives took comfort in the strictness of the law, while liberals
noted the evasions by which marriages were frequently dissolved. 139 Legislators
of both stripes were loath to awaken
"sleeping dogs" 140 and risk heated debates about family breakdown. By avoiding the issue and maintaining the liberal-conservative stalemate, lawmakers "lived in the best of all possible
worlds."' 4 ' But in 1965, the Court of Appeals upset the divorce
impasse by legitimizing bi-lateral Mexican divorce in Rosenstiel
143
v. Rosenstiel. 42 In the ensuing fallout, the "coup de grace"
was finally delivered to the long-standing liberal-conservative
deadlock. 4
As stated previously, for those who could afford it, procurement of a bi-lateral Mexican divorce was a matter of ease and
convenience. In sanctioning these procedures, New York's highest court exposed the "inanity" 45 of the restrictive law and rendered it "practically worthless." 146 Further, it highlighted the
social and economic inequities 47 of a law which generated dual
systems, for the rich and for the poor, for those "willing to en148
gage in subterfuge and ... those who were not."
Divorce reform arose out of a report, dated March 31, 1966,
of the Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family
Laws, known as the Wilson Committee. Jerome Wilson was a
junior legislator and member of the Democratic party's reform
137. Teitelbaum, supra note 81, at 9.
138. Id.
139. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 353.

140. Id. at 353.
141. HALEM, supra note 56, at 255.
142. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1965).
143. HALEM, supra note 56, at 257.
144. RHEINSTEIN, zupra note 8, at 353.

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at 357.
FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 264.
HALEM, supra note 56, at 257.
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wing.149 He collaborated with Henry H. Foster of New York
University Law School in drafting both the Committee report
and the proposed legislation. 150 In 1965, Wilson had conducted
state-wide hearings attracting some media attention. Testimony revealed the extent to which the public and the legal community were repelled by hypocrisies induced by the existing
law.' 5' The Association of the Bar of the City of New York gave
strong support to the bill through persuasive testimony by Howard Hilton Spellman, special committee chairman. Spellman
averred that the "orgy of perjury" produced by the current law
had incited judges and lawyers to a state of "virtual rebellion." 52 He further noted that an uncontested divorce hearing
averaged about seven and one-half minutes in length and constituted a "formal farce." 53 Mexican divorces wholly ignored
the interests of children of the marriage, as they provided for no
inquiry into matters of support, custody or visitation. 5 4 The
"self-help" engendered by informal separations and desertions
created "irregular relationships" and illegitimate children who
strained the welfare rolls. 55 Again and again, the Committee
was made aware of how "the formal law had spawned a set of
practices inconsistent with any notions of sound public policy." 156 Viewed in this way, divorce became something other
than grist for the conservative-liberal debate. Because the issue was framed as "disjunction between law-on-the-books and
law in action," divorce reform could be presented as a muchneeded "procedural"change. 157 This, plus a series of auspicious
events, shifted reform away from the political storm center and
158
allowed it to proceed.
In 1962, Governor Nelson Rockefeller, whose wife had obtained a Nevada divorce earlier that year, was re-elected by a
considerable majority. That the state's highest official could
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

JACOB, supra note 17, at 37.
Id. at 39.
Teitelbaum, supra note 81, at 2.
Committee Report, supra note 2, at 38.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
Teitelbaum, supra note 81, at 4.
JACOB, supra note 17, at 33 [italics in original].

158. Id.; FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 264-65.
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flout the intent of the law and still garner public support was
not lost on the politically observant. 15 9 Also in 1962, a U.S. Supreme Court decision required state legislative districts to be
equalized through re-apportionment. 160 In Albany, increased
representation by urban legislators served to sap the strength
of upstate Republicans opposed to reform.' 6' Pope John XXIII
had "liberalized many aspects of Catholic life,"' 62 and Cardinal
Spellman, long active as power broker on New York's political
scene, became older, less vigorous and less influential. 63 Liberal Catholics, as well as leading clergy of all faiths, gathered
64
together in vocal support of reform.
The proposed reform bill, sponsored at the 1966 session by
the Joint Legislative Committee, was known as the "WilsonSutton Bill."1 65 The resulting legislation was a compromise between the Wilson-Sutton Bill and an alternate bill proposed by
Senators Travia, Hughes and Brydges. 6 6 Effective September
1, 1967, the law now provided for divorce on the grounds of
adultery, cruel and inhumane treatment, abandonment for two
or more years, confinement in prison for three or more years,
and living apart for a period of two years or more pursuant to
167
an agreement or a judicial separation decree.
159. See

HALEM,

supra note 56, at 258; see also RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at

357.
160. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
161. JACOB, supra note 17, at 36.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 37.
164. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 264. According to one New York legislator, "what finally killed the [restrictive divorce] law . . . 'was a man named
John-Pope John.'" New York Reforms Divorce, TIMES, May 6, 1966, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901868,00.html ("With the reforming spirit of Vatican II blowing strong, New York's Roman Catholic bishops
toned down their opposition to change, and the legislators scrambled into action.");
RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 325 (referring to "the position taken in the Roman
Catholic church at Vatican Council II and applied by the organization of Catholic
laymen in its assent to divorce law reform in New York").
165. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 264.
166. HALEM, supra note 56, at 258.
167. Id. at 258-59; JACOB, supra note 17, at 40-41; 1966 N.Y. Laws ch. 254.
Judicial separation decrees require a showing of marital fault. In the alternative,
parties may separate pursuant to a written agreement, filed with the Clerk of the
Court, with no finding of fault. In either case, parties must live apart for the prescribed statutory period in compliance with the terms of the decree or the agreement. Once the waiting period has expired, either party may petition the court to
convert the separation into a divorce. In judicial separations, either the innocent
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Conservatives balked at this last provision, insisting that it
was "tantamount to divorce by consent if both parties concurred
and divorce by demand if one applied for conversion against the

other's wishes ....

."168

In exchange for supporting the bill, con-

servatives demanded safeguards against easy divorce. 169 Filing
procedures were rendered so complex that legal fees soared out
of reach for many. 70 In addition, the two-year waiting period
for conversion divorce was protracted and thus somewhat unappealing. 17 ' Further concessions exacted by conservatives included elaborate, mandatory counseling and conciliation
procedures. 72 Ultimately, these procedures proved costly, unwieldy and ineffective, and were abolished in 1973.173 A 1970
revision reduced the waiting period for conversion divorces from
174
two years to one.
In 1970, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the legality
175
and retroactivity of conversion divorce in Gleason v. Gleason.
Explicit in the court's reasoning was the rejection of any state
interest in compelling couples to remain together in marriages
that were clearly defunct. Furthermore, the court concluded
that the purpose of the "nonfault provision" allowing for conversion divorce was to remove issues of misconduct from the court's
consideration. 76 In one writer's view, Gleason amounted to the
court's having endorsed "no-fault divorce on moral and social
grounds." 177 Another contended that, when New York sanctioned divorce based on conversion of separation agreements,
"no one recognized it as no-fault." 7 Although a frank improvement over purely fault-based law, conversion divorce is only as
good as its parties' intentions. Requiring separation pursuant
party or the party against whom a judgment has been made may apply for conversion. See RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 354-55; HALEM, supra note 56, at 259.
168. HALEM, supra note 56, at 259.
169. Id.; RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 356.
170. HALEM, supra note 56, at 259.
171. Id.
172. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 356; HALEM, supra note 56, at 259-60.
173. JACOB, supra note 17, at 42.
174. 1970 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1717 (McKinney); see 1970 N.Y. Laws ch. 835 § 2.
The reduction was effective in actions commenced on or after September 1, 1972.
175. Gleason v. Gleason, 256 N.E.2d 513 (N.Y. 1970).
176. Id. at 516.
177. HALEM, supra note 56, at 266.
178. JACOB, supra note 17, at 42.
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to decree or agreement may well allow parties to "perpetuate
the bonds of acrimony" 17 9 for malicious reasons. Where there is
neither decree nor agreement, recalcitrant or spiteful spouses
can consign a dead marriage to a state of limbo. The only recourse is to end the stalemate by alleging fault or moving to a
18 0
state with suitable divorce grounds.
To date, New York remains reluctant to completely renounce the marital misconduct model. Too, perhaps a "moralistic message" 18 is conveyed by the year-long waiting
requirement for conversion divorce. Still, in adopting this approximation of no-fault, New York was credited as having
joined the twentieth century 182 and the increasing number of
18 3
states who had abandoned the "guilt principle.'
In the 1960s, while New York was wrestling with reform,
England and California were also revamping their divorce statutes. To stanch the flood of spurious, fault-based divorces, each
sought relief in new no-fault regimes. Believing that findings of
fault obscured the true state of the marriage, each sought to
dislodge it as central to the divorce equation. Only one of them
entirely succeeded.
In mid-twentieth century England, divorce was available
on the grounds of adultery, cruelty, desertion for three years or
incurable insanity after five years confinement. 8 4 In 1956, the
Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, chaired by Lord
Morton of Henryton, produced an exhaustive report. 8 5 The
Morton Commission cited the harmful effect of divorce on children and deplored easy dissolution as "fatal to stability and se-

curity in marriage ..

..

"186

Ten years later, the Archbishop of

Canterbury announced the Church's position on divorce in Putting Asunder: A Divorce Law for Contemporary Society.187 Ear179. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 25, at 280.
180. Id.
181. HALEM, supra note 56, at 267.
182. JACOB, supra note 17, at 42.
183. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 366.
184. See DiFonzo, supra note 1, at 888.

185. Id. at 889.
186. ROYAL COMMISSION ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, Report 1951-56, Cm.
9678, at 15.
187. REPORT OF THE MORTIMER COMMISSION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, PUTTING ASUNDER: A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY app. a,
19 (1966).
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lier divorce law critics had recognized that marital fault
resulted in divorce "upon proof of transgression, entirely without regard to the actual state of the marriage.lRS PuttingAsunder proposed that, in addition to proving marital fault, a divorce
petitioner should have the burden of showing that the marriage
had broken down. 8 9 In lieu of pro forma proceedings, the court
would conduct an inquest in each divorce case to determine
whether the marriage, in fact, had breathed its last. Assisted
by social workers, the court's inquiry would be therapeutic in
nature, with mandatory reconciliation measures if appropriate.
Putting Asunder was then referred to the Law Commission,
which was statutorily mandated to review all English law. The
Law Commission rejected the inquest system as highly subjective and emotionally invasive. 190 Rather, the Law Commission
proposed that divorce be obtainable on the sole ground of marital breakdown, established by proof of one of the following:
adultery, cruelty, desertion for two years, separation for two
years on consent of the respondent, and separation for five
years. No longer would mere evidence of fault guarantee divorce. Instead, the court retained authority, upon establishment of one of the aforementioned factors, to evaluate and
determine the extent of actual marital breakdown. With minor
changes, this "legislative stew of fault and no-fault" was codified
in England's Divorce Reform Act of 1969.191
In California, proponents of no-fault took heart from the
Church of England's endorsement of the marital breakdown
standard. 192 Like the Archbishop's group, California reformers
viewed fault-based divorce as conducive to collusion and hostility. Furthermore, it terminated marriages which might yet be
viable. 193 Governor Edmund G. Brown was duly alarmed by
California's high rate of divorce and its corrosive effect on social
stability. Despite its fault-based provenance, the state's existing law was, in practice, quite lenient. '94 As stated by Herma
Hill Kay, reformer and professor at the University of California
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

DiFonzo, supra note 1, at 892.
Id. at 895.
Id. at 895-96.
Id. at 896-97.
JACOB, supra note 17, at 47; HALEM, supra note 56, at 237.
RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8,at 375; DiFonzo, supra note 1, at 902.
JACOB, supra note 17, at 46.
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Boalt School of Law, "It was impossible to make divorce easier
1 95
in California than it already was."
In 1966, the Governor's Commission specifically condemned the use of fault grounds as promoting undue stigma
and antagonism. 196 Proposing to replace the term "divorce"
with "dissolution of a marriage," the Commission strongly
urged abandonment of all fault grounds. 197 It further called for
the creation of a specialized family court system, echoing the
Church of England's advocacy of therapeutic divorce. This new
system, envisioned as a "potent socio-legal agency," 198 would
furnish counseling at various stages of the proceeding. After
the couple had run the gauntlet of diagnosis, investigation and
counseling, the court would decide whether or not the marriage
was beyond repair. 199
California's Family Law Act, signed by Governor Ronald
Reagan, became effective in 1970 and "came to be known as the
nation's first no-fault divorce law."20 0 It permitted dissolution of
the marriage solely upon grounds of incurable insanity or irreconcilable differences leading to irremediable breakdown of the
marriage. 20 ' The proposed family court system, however, did
not survive legislative compromise. Not only was it expensive,
but, to the disapproval of many, the complex restructuring of
the courts would have replaced "a legal orientation with a cura20 2
tive one."
For a while, the spirit of fault continued to hover within
California's reform legislation. As enacted, the law allowed
courts to hear evidence of specific acts of misconduct to assist
them in establishing the existence of irreconcilable differences.
The legislature repealed this provision in 1975, thereby expung195. Id. (quoting Herma Hill Kay, interview with author, Berkley, Ca., Feb.
11, 1985)).
196. HALEM, supra note 56, at 241.
197. Id.
198. DiFonzo, supra note 1, at 900.
199. HALEM, supra note 56, at 242.
200. JACOB, supra note 17, at 59; see Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608,
§ 4506, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3314, 3324 (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310
(West 2004)).
201. Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, § 4506, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3314, 3324
(current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 2004)).
202. HALEM, supra note 56, at 243.
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ing the last vestiges of fault from California's divorce law. 20 3
California's "legal and cultural transformation" 2 4 soon put nofault on the national stage. In 1970, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA"). Under the UMDA, irretrievable breakdown of the marriage constituted the sole
ground of divorce. 20 5 The term "irretrievable breakdown" is undefined, leading to the possibility of differing interpretations by
20 6
liberal and conservative courts.
In the realm of divorce reform, concepts of liberalism and
conservatism tended to become unmoored from their traditional
meanings. When California and England boldly embraced nofault, they believed (erroneously) that they had "closed the door
on easy divorce." 20 7 California's interest was not in "liberalizing
divorce law in accordance with changing social attitudes .... 2 os
Rather, it was attempting to preserve family stability by making divorces harder to obtain. 20 9 New York's liberals battled
firmly-entrenched religious and traditional notions of family life
to achieve reform. 210 Their modest gains, however, were essentially procedural rather than substantive, 211 and remained circumscribed by fault. All three, England, California and New
York, staunchly proclaimed that their approval of reform was,
in no way, a condonation of that great evil, divorce by consent.
It is interesting that all three jurisdictions jettisoned their
elaborate systems of counseling and conciliation. This is especially surprising in view of how these systems were designed to
ward off the demon of easy, consensual divorce. Their cost, in
human and financial resources, was certainly a factor. But it
may well be that the "sheriff and the social worker do not
merge" 212 because the language of law adapts so uneasily to the
203. DiFonzo, supra note 1, at 907.
204. Id.
205. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 160 (1970).

206. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 385.
207. DiFonzo, supra note 1, at 903.
208. HALEM, supra note 56, at 239.
209. DiFonzo, supra note 1, at 903.
210. JACOB, supra note 17, at 44-45.
211. Id. at 33.
212. J. Herbie DiFonzo, Coercive Conciliation:Judge Paul Alexander and the
Movement for Therapeutic Divorce, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 535, 575 (1994).
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"preset rubric" of interdisciplinary schemes. 213 Like fault-based
divorce, the therapeutic model now appears quaint and incongruous. Perched at opposite ends of the divorce spectrum, each
approach seems out of place and out of time.
New York, however, remains wedded to fault divorce. In
2004 (the last year for which data is available), New York
courts awarded 58,851 divorces. 214 Of these, only 4,473, or 7.6
percent, were obtained under one of the two "conversion"
grounds, the only no-fault alternatives. 21 5 Divorces granted on
grounds of cruelty, abandonment, imprisonment, or adultery
numbered 52,048, or 88.4 percent. 216 In short, almost 90 percent of New York divorces in 2004 were obtained under fault
grounds. Recent history shows that the debate over fault divorce in the Empire State has shifted from morality to economics. To understand why New York remains unique in this
regard, an exploration of divorce finance reform is in order.
V.

Equitable Distribution and Maintenance:
The 1980 Compromise

The 1966 divorce reform was unaccompanied by any
change in the financial consequences of divorce. New York retained the traditional common law view that legal title to property was determinative of its ownership upon divorce. 2 17 Under
this system, the husband, as the breadwinner and title holder,
usually emerged from the marriage with most of the property. 21 8 The wife, who was generally left without sufficient
213. Id.
214. Vital Statistics of New lork State 2004, Table 50: Divorces by County of
Decree and Legal Grounds, availableat http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/vital

_statistics/2004/table50.htm [hereinafter Vital Statistics].
215. Id.; see also N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 170 (5) & (6) (McKinney 2007). Among

all the states "[o]nly New York requires the finding of fault or the living apart
pursuant to a legal document as the basis for a divorce." N.Y. State Office of Court
Administration, Matrimonial Commission Report 19 n. 23 (Feb. 2006), available
at http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/matrimonialcommissionAPPENDICES.pdf.
216. Vital Statistics, supra note 214. The ground was "not stated" in 2,330
divorces, or 4 percent of the total Id.
217. See BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.02, at 4
(2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2004).
218. See Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW,
§ 236 (McKinney 1999) ("In practice, the title concept worked a great hardship
upon a spouse, often the wife, whose mate accumulated property during marriage
and held title in his or her name only. When the marriage was dissolved, absent

586

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:559

property or earning potential to support herself after divorce,
2 19
was theoretically entitled to permanent or long-term alimony.
In contrast with the 41 formerly "title" states, eight states adhere to the community property system, under which all income
earned by either spouse or property purchased with those earnings is marital property. No matter how title is held, each
spouse owns one-half of all marital property. 220 A ninth state,
Wisconsin, is often deemed a community property state because
it models its system on the similar principles of the Uniform
221
Marital Property Act.
Modern divorce reform began in New York, but no state followed its lead. Instead, the models which had the greatest success throughout the nation came from two sources: California's
no-fault divorce law222 and the original 1970 version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA"). 223 Using definitions
typical of community property systems, the UMDA became a
prototype for widely-adopted equitable distribution statutes, in
which courts are directed to make a just division of marital
property, based on a series of factors. 224 The UMDA broadly defined marital property as "[a]ll property acquired by either
actual fraud or other ground for equity, intervention, ownership of all the property
went to the title-holding spouse, notwithstanding the contributions made toward
the property or toward the marriage by the non-titled spouse."); Bea Ann Smith,
The PartnershipTheory of Marriage:A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEx. L. REV.
689, 697 n.47 (1990).
219. J. Thomas Oldham, Divorce, Separation, & The Distribution of Property
§ 3.02(1), at 33 (2001). On the history of alimony, showing it to be awarded in far
lower amounts than the popular culture supposed, as well as both infrequently
ordered and even more rarely enforced, see DiFonzo, supra note 45, at 62-64, 10711; see id. at 62 (describing the "most striking aspect of alimony [as] its scarcity");
Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1106-07
(1989) ("[TIhe husband's continuing 'duty of support' has always been more myth
than reality for most divorced women").
220. See TURNER, supra note 217, § 1.02, at 5.
221. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT, 9A U.L.A. (pt. I) 103 (1998).
222. See FAMILY LAW ACT of 1969, ch. 1608, § 4506, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3314, 3324
(current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 2004)).
223. See DiFonzo, supra note 1, at 897-908 (discussing the impact of California no-fault divorce reform and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A.
(pt. I) 289-90 (1998)). Although only eight states have adopted the UMDA, the act
has greatly influenced the terms of divorce reform for many states. Id. at 907 &
n.176.
224. Note that one key difference between the two systems remains: unlike a
community property scheme, equitable property distribution applies only at divorce; legal title continues to govern in an intact marriage. See Marsha Garrison,
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spouse after the marriage ... regardless of whether title is held
individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership."225
As a community property state, California courts already followed similar prescriptions in allocating property upon
226
divorce.
Throughout the 1970s, almost all the American states
outside the community property ambit adopted equitable distribution laws which deemed marriage an economic partnership
and which aimed "to credit the unpaid work that the typical
non-employed homemaker put into the partnership." 227 The
process of reforming New York divorce finances proved prolonged and controversial. Some women's and other groups opposed the equitable distribution proposal, fearing what they
228
deemed the excessive discretion entrusted to divorce judges.
Some legislators worried that an equitable distribution law
would encourage divorce. 229 Proponents of reform divided into
those who favored a presumption of equal division and those
who opposed any suggestion of mathematical precision. 230 Added to a general concern over yielding too much discretionary
power to the courts, it took a decade of political struggle to finally enact an equitable distribution law. 231 Bills proposing
some form of equal or equitable property distribution were proposed in the legislature each year from 1972 until 1980.232 By
the time that New York adopted equitable distribution for diGood Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable DistributionLaw
on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 628 (1991).
225. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 160 (1970).
226. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5105 (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (West
2004)) ("The respective interests of the husband and wife in community property
during continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing and equal
interests").
227. NANCY COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 206
(2000). Alicia Brokars Kelly, RehabilitatingPartnershipMarriageas a Theory of
Wealth Distributionat Divorce: In Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIs. WOMEN'S
L.J. 141, 142-43 (2004) ("Sharing a life together profoundly influences the ways in
which couples structure and shape their lives... . [Miodern family law recognizes
this sharing process through its embrace of partnership marriage as the dominant
theory of marriage and divorce.").
228. See Marcus, supra note 3, at 441 n.266.
229. Id. at 441-42 n.267.
230. Id. at 440-41.
231. Id. at 440.
232. Id.
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vorce cases in 1980, the state was one of only six remaining
233
common law title jurisdictions.
In the end, reform of property division in divorce was tied
to a fundamental alteration in the law of alimony. Traditionally, the duty of spousal support ran only from a divorced husband to his ex-wife. 2 34 A New York statute of 1813 allowed for
235
permanent alimony only to divorced non-adulterous wives.
Over a century and a half later, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional such a gendered provision of spousal
support. 236 This 1979 decision came as the heated debates over
divorce finances were coming to a boil, and the Supreme Court's
alimony ruling proved a prod to compromise. Although New
York's alimony statute could have been rectified by the mere
substitution of "spouse" for "wife," the need to revise this one
aspect of the economic consequences of divorce "accelerated the
237
drive for a more extensive reform."
The Equitable Distribution Law was described as "the most
sweeping reform of the divorce laws in [New York] since the Divorce Reform Act of 1966."238 The legislature replaced alimony
with "maintenance" payments, which were to be calculated to
preserve the parties' standard of living during the marriage and
to provide for the recipient's "reasonable needs."239 Courts were
encouraged by this legislation to limit the duration of maintenance payments to induce recipients to become self-supporting
240
as rapidly as possible.
233. Act of July 19, 1980, ch. 21, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1225; Marcus, supra note 3,
at 438-39 n.256.
234. See HOMER H. CLAaK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 420-27 (1968);
Chester G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The HistoricalBackgroundof Alimony Law
and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1939).

235. An Act Concerning Divorces, and for other Purposes, ch. 102, 1813 N.Y.
Laws 197, 199.
236. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down Alabama statute authorizing the imposition of alimony obligations on husbands in favor of wives, but not on
wives in favor of husbands).
237. Marcus, supra note 3, at 443.
238. Scheinkman, supra note 218 (quoting Governor's Memorandum of Approval, 1980 N.Y. Session Laws 1863 (McKinney)).
239. Act of July 19, 1980, ch. 21, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1225.
240. A legislative memorandum explaining the new statute indicates that an
award of maintenance "should rest on the economic basis of reasonable needs and
the ability to pay." Garrison, supra note 224 , at 640 (citing 1980 New York State
Legislative Annual, Memorandum of Assemblyman Gordon W. Burrows 130) [here-
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Concerns about gender equity did not fade with the passage
of the Equitable Distribution Law. The focus of inquiry has centered on whether the economic partnership theory articulated
in the legislation has been effectuated by the quotidian decisions of divorce courts. Both empirical data and normative
scholarship-here and throughout the United States-indicate
that divorce generally results in an increased standard of living
for men, while exposing women and children to a significant financial decline. 241 Despite the dramatic changes intended by
the legislation, trial courts in fact do not "view contributions to
the marriage and its assets from unwaged work in the home as
the equivalent of contributions to the marriage and its assets
from waged work."242 In 1986, the New York State Task Force
on Women in the Courts concluded that "[i]any lower court
judges have demonstrated a predisposition not to recognize or
to minimize the homemaker spouse's contributions to the marital economic partnership." 243 Although the Equitable Distribution Law left open the possibility that marital fault might be
inafter Burrows Memorandum]. According to this Memorandum, permanent
maintenance may be necessary "in marriages of long duration, or where the former
spouse is out of the labor market and lacks sufficient resources, or has sacrificed
her business or professional career to serve as a parent and homemaker;" Garrison, supranote 224, at 640, but the objective of maintenance is to "award the recipient spouse an opportunity to achieve independence." Id. The Burrows
Memorandum was favorably cited in a key Court of Appeals opinion recognizing
the shift from permanent alimony to rehabilitative maintenance. O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716 (N.Y. 1985) ("The concept of alimony, which often
served as a means of lifetime support and dependence for one spouse upon the
other long after the marriage was over, was replaced with the concept of maintenance which seeks to allow 'the recipient spouse an opportunity to achieve [economic] independence."') (citing Burrows Memorandum).
241. See generally D. KELLY WEISBERG & SusAN F. APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 594 & n.8 (3d ed. 2006) (citing sources); see also Marcus, supra note 3, at
460 n.325 (citing survey results from the 1980s indicating that equitable distribution awards "reflect a judicial attitude that property belongs to the husband and a
wife's share is based on how much the husband could give her without diminishing
his current life style").
242. Marcus, supra note 3, at 460. Studies showed that women suffered substantial economic losses, "particularly when they had foregone wage-earning work
in order to care for children and the household during marriage." Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage:Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227,
1239 (citing studies).
243. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, REPORT 121
(1986). This attitude is both pervasive and continuing. See, e.g., Cynthia Lee
Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership,and Divorce Discourse, 90 IowA L.
REV. 1513, 1515 (2005) (footnote omitted):
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considered in dividing the parties' property, a 1985 Court of Appeals decision held that fault could not be considered in property division "[e]xcept in egregious cases which shock the
conscience of the court."244 In 1986, the legislature amended the
law to allow indefinite maintenance payments in cases of older
and disabled women with no job skills other than homemaking
and child-rearing. 245 The amendment was intended to ensure
that a homemaker from a long-term marriage, whose ability to
find suitable employment following divorce is limited, does not
experience a standard of living decrease while the other
246
spouse's standard of living remains constant or improves.
What was the overall effect of the divorce finance reforms
in New York? A well-regarded empirical study of the impact of
these laws concluded that the consequences failed to reflect the
legislative intent:
Property division, where the New York law was intended to have
its most significant impact, does not appear to have been affected
in any major way. The likelihood and duration of alimony awards
was, however, markedly reduced. While this result was, to some
extent, an expectable one given the establishment of an alimony
regime emphasizing rehabilitative goals, the extent of the change
and the impact of the new rules on long-married and low income
wives appears to have been an unintended consequence of the
new law .247

The connection between the fractured results of financial
reform and the controversy over a true no-fault divorce law is
the subject of the next section.

Many mothers have been stunned to learn that after years of viewing themselves as proud and valuable contributors to marriage, to family, to a new
generation, the law of divorce views them as suckers. Surely this is a mistake, a mother might insist, a confusion of identities, a dialectical lapse that
will be corrected as soon as it is discovered. Sadly, there is no mistake. The
dispiriting message is that primary caretakers, the vast majority of whom
are mothers, have been duped into providing free family caretaking at great
personal economic cost; a price they must pay for their imprudent ways.
Id.
244.
245.
246.
247.

O'Brien, 498 N.E.2d at 750.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6) (1986).
See Sperling v. Sperling, 567 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1991).
Garrison, supra note 224, at 725.
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The Prospects for No-Fault Divorce in New York

The conundrum remains: why does New York, alone in the
United States, retain an overwhelmingly fault-driven divorce
law? On the surface, the legal system has written gender out of
the divorce equation on both property division and maintenance. Thus, it might initially appear that the objections based
on economic injustice for women have been eliminated, at least
as reflected in the formal legal norms. Nor can New York's
fault grounds generally supply financial incentives for a putative litigant, since marital fault is not relevant to determinations of support or property division unless it is so severe as to
"shock the conscience." 248 Yet the prospect of no-fault divorce
remains controversial. This section explores the reasons why
New York continues to debate an issue the rest of the country
has long since put to rest.
Some women's groups have argued that enacting true nofault divorce would harm women by allowing the generally
wealthier husband to obtain a divorce before the economic and
support issues are resolved. 249 As Marcia Pappas, President of
New York's chapter of the National Organization of Women,
phrased the argument, "[U]nilateral no-fault divorce . . . hurts
women by removing the incentive for the moneyed spouse (who
is usually the husband) to make a settlement. Instead of negotiating with a dependent spouse-whose only leverage for
avoiding an impoverished post-divorce life for herself and her
children may be her assent, or lack of it, to divorce-the husband can simply go to court and obtain an uncontested divorce." 250 Moreover, should New York adopt no-fault divorce,
248. O'Brien, 498 N.E.2d at 750.
249. See, e.g., Emily Jane Goodman, Divorce, New York-Style, Gotham Gazette, Mar. 2006, available at http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/law/
20060307/13/1781 ("The fear is that a husband can simply go to court, and essentially say 'I divorce thee,' and go on his way without any court orders for property
division, support, or child custody"); Christine Vestal, NY wants a better no-fault
divorce law, Stateline.org, Mar. 21, 2006, available at http://www.stateline.org/
live/details/story?contentld=97537 ("New York tiptoed around the no-fault divorce
issue in the past because opponents contended women would not be awarded fair
alimony payments following the break up of a marriage if they lost the leverage of
finding fault.").
250. Marcia Pappas, Divorce New York Style, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2006. See
also Maggie Gallagher, NY Judge Would Make Divorce Too Easy, Feb. 22, 2006,
available at http://www.theconservativevoice.com/article/12613.html ("Unilateral
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"resolution of child custody and property division can drag on
25 1
for years, to the detriment of the abandoned poorer spouse."
From another vantage point, the Coalition of Fathers and
Families New York, Inc. "vigorously opposes" no-fault divorce. 252 In the words of Randall Dickinson, no-fault laws "have
essentially acted to empower whichever party wants out, leaving the spouse who wants to preserve the marriage powerless to
prevent its dissolution and with no recourse but acquiescence." 25 3 This critique of no-fault divorce's supposed easy exit
to unwanted marriage echoes calls by some scholars for an end
to a divorce process seen as facilitating individual irresponsibil254
ity at the expense of mutuality and the welfare of children.
Similarly, the removal of fault from divorce throughout the
nation has been criticized as an inappropriate erasure of culpadivorce is a bad idea whose time has passed"); but see Women's Bar Association of
the State of New York, No-Fault Divorce Editorial, July 13, 2006, available at
http://www.wbasny.bluestep.net/shared/content/storyjsp?-event=view&_id=
445502_U127802_200779 (explaining the support of the Women's Bar Association
for no-fault divorce).
251. Pappas, supra note 250.
252. Randall Dickinson, Hearing Testimony of The Coalition of Fathers and
Families New York, Inc., N.Y State Office of Court Administration,Matrimonial
Commission, Nov. 4, 2004, available at http://www.fafny.org/Opinion-Legislativefiles-msword/05-01-OlTestimony%20II.pdf.
253. Id. Dickinson added that
the single greatest factor in determining which party is most likely to initiate a divorce is the expectation of being awarded custody of the kids. Along
with the kids usually comes a whole range of other financial benefits, as
well, including child support, alimony, the marital residence, and one half of
the remaining marital assets ....
Id. See also Maggie Gallagher, End No-Fault Divorce: Yes, 75 First Things 24-30
(Aug./Sept. 1997), available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9708/gallagher.html (contending that the "primary purpose [of no-fault divorce] is to empower whichever party wants out, with the least possible fuss and the greatest
possible speed, no questions asked").
254. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriageand Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 871 (1994) ("The changes in the institutional structure that make marital promises unenforceable and allow opportunistic behavior
are the enactment in many states of no-fault divorce with the simultaneous removal of fault (breach) as a consideration in grants of spousal support and property division"); Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means of ReInjecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605, 606 (1996)
("ITihe advent of no-fault divorce signaled an end to the notion of marriage as a
status having at its core the concept of a contract with God and spouse, the breaking of which necessitated circumstances which were intolerable and unavoidable fault.").
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bility, thus muddying the moral message of marriage. A movement to reverse the perceived evils of unilateral no-fault divorce
has garnered popular and scholarly attention and generated
numerous proposals to reinforce marital commitment and make
divorce more difficult. 255 No-fault divorce has been denounced
for eroding "the idea of marriage as a presumptively permanent
relationship-as a structure of incentives for individuals to contribute to the well-being of the family, and a framework of reasonable expectations of reciprocal benefits over the lifetime of
256
the partnership."
A number of commentators have been reassessing whether
fault factors may still serve a legitimate purpose in no-fault divorce regimes. 25 7 Various reasons have been cited for this reconsideration of blameworthiness, including "the growing
evidence that divorce often hurts children, feminists' renewed
recognition of the importance of legal protection for mothers
raising children, and concerns about the economic disparities
created by differences in marriage rates."258 Efforts to retrench
on no-fault divorce have included the introduction of myriad
legislative bills throughout the nation designed to resurrect
259
marital fault as the heart of divorce litigation.
255. See, e.g., Katherine Shaw Spaht, Beyond Baehr: Strengthening the Definition of Marriage, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 277, 279 (1998) ("To strengthen the definition of marriage it is essential that we 'The People' enact laws that make divorce
more difficult.").
256. William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, PuB. INT. L. REV., Summer
1996, at 12-13.
257. See, e.g., Allen M. Parkman, Reforming Divorce Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 379 (2001); Jana B. Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why
the Shoe Won't Fit, 31 FAM. L.Q. 119 (1997); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revolution
and Counter-Revolution: The Future of Marriage in the Law, 49 Lov. L. REV. 1
(2003); Peter Nash Swisher, Marriageand Some Troubling Issues with No-Fault
Divorce, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 243 (2004-2005); Lynne D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 79 (1991); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation:The Discourseof Fault in a No-Fault Era,
82 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1994).
258. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Don't Let Divorce Off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 2006, at 14LI. Wilson also contended that gay marriage advocates have played
a role in this shift, in suggesting that "easy divorce," not same-sex unions, threaten
the institution of marriage. Id. See also Woodhouse, supra note 257, at 2529-30
(arguing that legal recognition of fault may "provide protection and compensation
for victims of abuse [of] spousal trust").
259. See DiFonzo, supra note 1, at 916-17, 927-28, 949-54 (analyzing proposals reintroducing fault divorce; none of these bills have been enacted). Another
cluster of recommendations counsels couples to engage in pre-commitment bar-
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Some scholars have argued, however, that fault-based divorce accentuates any bad feelings and malevolence of the parties and makes them less inclined to reconcile. 260 This
contention "challenges the assumption that no-fault divorce...
signaled a retreat from either a moral vision or moral discourse
in family law,"26 1 claiming instead that "fault-based proposals

ultimately are destructive and counterproductive to divorcing
individuals and families." 262 Of course, not all fault divorces involve actual contests. But many do, and even when both
spouses desire the divorce, one partner must publicly accuse the
263
other of matrimonial misconduct.
gaining designed to allow them to contractually bind themselves to each other
more tightly than the law currently allows. See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans
Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:Personalizing the MarriageContract, 73 IND.
L.J. 453, 464-65 (1998) (calling for the enforcement of a wide range of private
agreements regarding divorce grounds and the terms of an ongoing marriage).
Covenant marriage laws, according couples the right to renounce recourse to the
state's no-fault divorce law, define covenant marriage as a "lifelong relationship."
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A) (1997). Other proposals counsel mandatory
waiting periods before divorce actions may be filed; delays ranging from two to five
years have been specified. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field
Theory of the Family: The American Law Institute'sPrinciplesof the Law of Family
Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 923, 955 n.150 (2001) (summarizing proposals).
Schedules of obligatory pre-divorce counseling sessions have been proposed.
DiFonzo, supra note 1, at 927-28, 950-53 (providing examples). Finally, legislators
and commentators have urged making divorce more difficult or even unavailable to
couples with minor children. See id. at 927-30 (detailing proposed legislation
prohibiting or severely limiting the dissolution of marriages with minor children).
260. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriageas Contract,Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for FaultDivorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
719 (1997). Of course, there is evidence to support the notion of continued hostility
between the parties in no-fault divorces as well. See, e.g., DiFonzo, supra note 1, at
880 ("[Tjhere are .. . some indications that no-fault divorce litigation is becoming
more acrimonious, with the litigative fire transferred from conflicts over divorce
grounds to those over children and property issues.").
261. Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The
New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1111, 1115 (1999).
262. Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform
Proposals, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611,
611 (1999).
263. See The Long Divorce, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at 14LI:
Under [New York's] present law, a marriage cannot merely die. It must be
killed by one spouse or the other, through adultery, cruel and inhuman
treatment, or abandonment - even when none of these things have actually
occurred, and even when both people agree on all the particulars.
This means, in effect, that people have to lie; they have to go before a judge,
swear to tell the truth and then not tell the truth. Those who deal with these
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Across the board, divorce reform proposals have been pre264
mised on the conviction that divorce is a disaster for children.
But "[r]eintroducing tough divorce laws would recreate many of
265
the conditions that used to make divorce harder on children."
Indeed, it seems preposterous to argue that, since divorce is
often bad for children, to require that their parents accuse,
prove and/or dispute fault would enhance the children's lot.
Proponents of fault divorce esteem the "collective social condemnation... [and] [g]uilt and shame," which are "altogether missing in pure 'no-fault' divorce states." 266 They rely on the
unproven assertion that avoiding condemnation, guilt, and
shame will motivate parents to stay together in loveless marriages in order to improve their children's welfare. They ignore
the historical record, in New York and throughout the United
States, which show that generally "divorce law bears almost no
267
relation to the divorce rate."

issues day in and day out have concluded that pointing the finger at one
spouse makes negotiations uglier, costlier and longer.
264. See DiFonzo, supra note 1, at 909 ("Contemporary scholarly accounts are
rife with calls for an end to a divorce process seen as facilitating individual responsibility at the expense of mutuality and the welfare of children.").
265. Nicholas H. Wolfinger, The Mixed Blessings of No-Fault Divorce, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvoc. 407, 426-27 (2005).
Parents would wait longer before dissolving disastrous marriages, thereby
subjecting children to more conflict. The stigma of divorce would intensify if
couples again had to demonstrate legal fault in order to dissolve their marriages. Finally, parental divorce would send children a stronger message
about marital commitment than it does now, thereby increasing the chances
that they would end their own marriages.
Id. at 427.
266. Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the
Meaning of Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1571 (1998).

267. Joanna Grossman, Will New York FinallyAdopt True No-Fault Divorce?
Recent Proposals to Amend the State's Archaic Divorce Law, FINDLAw, Oct. 20,
2004, available at http://writ.lp.fmdlaw.com/grossman/20041020.html (emphasis
in original). "In practice, couples simply do not stay married merely because their
home state makes it hard for them to part ways. And they certainly do not become
happy together merely because divorce is too difficult or too expensive to obtain."
Id.; see also Report by the Committee on Matrimonial Law, The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, The Case for Amending the New York State Domestic
Relations Law to Permit No Fault Divorces, Nov. 2004, available at http://www.
abcny.org/pdf/report/divorce-memo.pdf (contending that no-fault divorce is not
detrimental to the institution of marriage, and that fault divorce statutes result in
harm both to the parties and any children). Nor do the advocates of requiring
culpability in divorce address the issue of when both parties are at fault for the
demise of the marriage, or when individual culpability is simply immaterial to the
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As New York's Matrimonial Commission concluded, after
weighing the substantial evidence provided at its public hearings and the professional experience of the Commission members, "fault allegations and fault trials add significantly to the
cost, delay and trauma of matrimonial litigation and are, in
many cases, used by litigants to achieve a tactical advantage in
268
matrimonial litigation."
That "tactical advantage" is intimately related to the fact
that many courts have failed to provide adequate post-divorce
financial protection for many women. 269 The lack of progress on
this front has been largely attributed to "the unequal distribution of assets following divorce, low female participation in the
270
labor force, and limited job skills among those who did work."
There is evidence that this inequity is being reduced as women's
education and wage employment skills increase. 271 But the central problem stems from a fundamental economic inequality between the genders which precedes a woman's entry into
marriage and follows her when she exits.27 2 In Martha
end of the union. See J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 1091, 1104-06 (1992). See also Mani v. Mani, 869 A.2d 904, 917 (N.J. 2005):
[C]onsidering non-economic fault can only result in ramping up the emotional content of matrimonial litigation and encouraging the parties to continually replay the details of their failed relationship. Not only is noneconomic fault nearly impossible to factor into an alimony computation, but
any attempt to do so would have the effect of generating complex legal issues regarding the apportionment of mutual fault, which is present in
nearly all cases. That, in turn, would result in the protraction of litigation
and the undermining of the goals of no-fault divorce, again without a corresponding benefit.
268. Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 215, at 18. See ANDREW I.
SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DiVORCING FAMILIES 27-44 (2004) (summarizing data showing that one of the prime

correlates to how well or poorly children cope with their parents' divorce is the
level of conflict manifested by the parents).
269. See Peter Nash Swisher, The ALI Principles:A Farewell to Fault-But
What Remedy for the Egregious MaritalMisconduct of an Abusive Spouse?, 8 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 213, 214 (2001).
270. Wolfinger, supra note 265, at 422.
271. See id. at 422-26 (describing empirical data); see also id. at 427 ("In the
last twenty years ...divorcees have made substantial economic gains, largely on
account of their labor force participation. Divorce still takes a toll on women's incomes, but not nearly as severe as it did in the past"); Oldham, supra note 219, at
1109 (same).
272. See generally Laura M. Padilla, Gendered Shades of Property:A Status
Check on Gender, Race & Property, 5 J.GENDER RACE & JUST. 361 (2002).
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Fineman's telling epigram, "marriage often conceals or masks
273
the poverty of women ... [;] divorce removes this mask."
New York's 1980 reforms in divorce finances were intended
to alleviate the gender inequality. But they yielded "confused,
inconsistent, and unexpected results."2 74 The legal bargain
struck in Albany was intended as a major boon to wives, since
husbands owned the vast bulk of valuable property, and once
the title regime yielded to equitable distribution, courts would
divide marital property equitably. In exchange for this benefit,
the legislature removed the lifetime alimony presumption. But
the legislative compromise missed its target, as Marsha Garrison cogently related:
[T]he average husband's individual net worth was scarcely more
than that of his wife, and the typical wife already received half of
the couple's meager assets. The property distribution provisions
of the new statute thus failed to provide major benefits to divorced
wives. The alimony provisions of the new statute, which in vague
terms authorized short-term "rehabilitative" alimony, had a major impact on divorced wives, however. But the dominant impact
did not fall on wives who were the intended candidates for shortterm alimony. Homemakers, the unemployed, and wives in long
marriages-all described in the statute's legislative history as
cases that should be treated as exceptions to the new, rehabilitative norm-saw their alimony prospects decline as much, or more,
than the alimony prospects of others. The statute's ambiguous
language not only permitted this result, but produced widespread
variation in case outcomes as well. 275
Most divorcing couples, in New York as elsewhere, have
few assets to divide. "Where there is little to share, the right to
share is of little consequence." 276 The post-divorce economic
needs of most wives below the upper middle class simply cannot
be achieved by equitable distribution of the marital assets. 277
The income of the higher wage-earning spouse turns out to
be far more valuable as an "asset" of a divorcing couple than its
273.

MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC

AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM

44 (1991).

274. Garrison, supra note 224, at 739.

275. Id.
276. Oldham, supra note 267, at 1102.
277. In New York in the early 1990s, property subject to distribution was usually worth less than $25,000. See Garrison, supra note 224, at 662-63.
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marital property. 278 This "asset" is not subject to distribution,
equitable or otherwise. To make matters worse for women, the
general and rapid demise of long-term alimony in the wake of
the divorce finance reforms increased the post-divorce gender
economic discrepancy. 279 Compounding this effect are two social facts: (1) women take up by far the caretaking burdens in
28 0
their families, of both minor children and elderly parents;
and (2) our society has a history of gender discrimination in pay
equity. 28 1 Thus, women's weaker economic position results, at
least in part, from both discrimination and women's more pronounced career-family dilemma. 28 2 Although studies vary, the
most accepted conclusion for the alterations in the post-divorce
278. See Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to
Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1504 (2001).
279. Maintenance payments are both insufficient and frankly unintended to
redress this imbalance. After the no-fault divorce revolution, the predominant
norm for divorce aimed at a decisive break in the financial aspects of the marital
relationship. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act exemplified this "clean
break" theory of divorce. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. (pt. I) 446
(1998). The American Law Institute ("ALI") has more recently approved its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (2002). In
contrast with the UMDA's emphasis on spousal need as the framework for maintenance, the ALI Principles fixed upon "compensation for losses rather than meeting
needs." Cf. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 347 (1987), with
ALI Principles, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis & Recommendations § 5.02 cmt. A (emphasis omitted) (2002).
280. See Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility,
Resources, and Republicanism, 76 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1673 (2001) (arguing that
women, who have traditionally, and who continue to, bear the burdens of the caretaking role, should be rewarded for their work by treating care as a "public value").
McClain emphasizes that "'care as a public value' casts a wide net," as caretaking
extends not only to children, but also elderly parents, dependent adults, and the
like. Id. at 1683 & n.29.
281. See Andrea Sachs, Women and Money, TIME , Feb. 6, 2006, at 67 (illustrating the wage gap between men and women, and showing that "87% of the impoverished elderly are women, men are four times as likely as women to negotiate
a first salary offer, resulting in more than half a million dollars in additional income by age 60"); see also Daniel Kuperstein, FindingWorth in the New Workplace:
The Implications of Comparable Worth's Reemergence in the Global Economy, 24
HoFsTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (discussing the disparity in wages
between men and women and analyzing suggested legislation that grapples with
the problem). For a theory why women represent a statistically lower proportion
of the workforce, see Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000)
(arguing that mass-cultural expectations that women be nurturing wives mothers
and daughters shape women's and society's notion of women as "inauthentic
workers").
282. See Garrison, supra note 224, at 726.
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economic status of men and women indicate a 30 percent average decline in women's standard of living and a 10 percent im283
provement in men's.
With this background, let us consider the proposal of the
Matrimonial Commission. The Commission urged the state legislature to amend the Domestic Relations Law and provide for
true no fault divorce. 28 4 While not endorsing any particular nofault proposal, the Commission recommended that any new law
"provide that no final Judgment of Divorce be entered until all
economic issues, including equitable distribution, maintenance
and child support, as well as custody are determined and those
determinations are incorporated into the judgment, unless the
parties consent in writing and good cause is shown."28 5 In effect, the Commission's proposal would institutionalize the practice of some judges who currently insist on resolving the
28 6
financial issues in divorce prior to granting the divorce itself.
The Commission's no-fault divorce recommendation seeks
to remedy the two most trenchant objections to current procedure. First, a moneyed spouse desirous of divorce would no
longer be able to obtain a rapid dissolution and then stall interminably on the issues of maintenance and equitable distribution, forcing the less-monied spouse to expend additional and
prolonged effort, time, and legal fees. With regard to counsel
and expert fees, the Commission recommended empowering
courts to award interim counsel fees to non-monied spouses in
matrimonial matters, and to direct that marital funds be used
283. See Stark, supra note 278, at 1504 n.134 (citing studies).
284. Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 215, at 18. The Report
noted that a minority of members "considered the issue of no-fault divorce to be
one of public policy that exceeds the scope of this Commission's mandate." Id. at
18 n.22. This group concurred in the Report's recommendation to the extent of
urging the legislature "to be mindful of the deleterious impact of fault-based divorce on matrimonial litigation and to include in any legislative change that may
result the requirements defined by the majority position." Id. Another minority
group opposed the Report's recommendation. This group considered no-fault divorce to be adverse to the interests of many litigants, "especially victims of domestic violence, and non-monied spouses who, generally, enjoy certain protections by
the existence of the grounds requirement." Id.
285. Id. at 19.
286. See Goodman, supra note 249 ("To protect the dependent spouse and children, some judges refuse to enter the judgment of divorce until the matters of equitable distribution of property, child support, maintenance for the non-monied
spouse (almost always the wife) can be adjudicated or agreed upon.").
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to pay the interim fees of attorneys and experts for either party
or both parties. 2 7 The Commission also suggested a streamlined procedure for enforcing via a court's contempt powers the
failure to pay court-ordered attorney's fees. 288 Acknowledging
the large proportion of unrepresented litigants in contested
matrimonial cases, the Commission recommended "both an expansion of the assigned counsel program and increased funding
to groups providing civil legal services, so as to provide counsel
to the low - and moderate-income litigants presently representing themselves before Supreme Court in divorce, custody,
28 9
parenting time and related matters."
Second, the Commission addressed the other more troubling fallout from New York's 1980 compromise on divorce finances: the inadequacy of current maintenance awards to
redress the post-divorce gender imbalance. The Commission acknowledged the "[slignificant frustration and dissatisfaction...
voiced by the public and the bar respecting the award of maintenance and the perception that these awards vary unpredictably
from court to court with little or no guidance, often resulting in
290
feelings of injustice and unequal treatment by the system."
But a majority of the Commission opposed the creation of
spousal maintenance guidelines. 29 1 What the Commission recommended instead was a two-part handling of the issues relating to New York's treatment of a spouse's "enhanced earnings
capacity." 292 Noting that New York is the only state to recognize enhanced earning capacity as an asset subject to equitable
distribution, the Commission summarized the objections to the
practice: "the intangible nature of the 'asset', the speculative
nature of its 'value' including the unfairness of creating a nonmodifiable award based on a projection of earnings, the cost of
287. Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 215, at 64-65.

288. Id. at 65. Further, with the aim of discouraging certain dilatory tactics
in the collection of maintenance awards, the Commission also recommended that
court-ordered payments of maintenance, child support, and attorney's fees be excepted from the automatic stay provisions of CPLR 5519 (a)(2) and (3). Id. at 37.
289. Id. at 58.
290. Id. at 66.
291. Id. The Commission Report concluded meekly that the issue of maintenance guidelines "deserved greater attention." Id.
292. See generally Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, 731 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 2000); McSparron v. McSparron, 662 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1995); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712
(N.Y. 1985).
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the valuation process, the problems of double counting when
coupled with maintenance and child support awards and the
multitude of litigation spawned by this concept that has in293
creased the cost and the length of matrimonial proceedings."
294
The Commission called for elimination of this rule.
But the Commission recognized "the need to address one
spouse's contributions to another's career and increased earning
capacity in any ultimate award on divorce." 295 Thus, in place of
the current treatment of enhanced earning capacity, the Report
proposed that a trial court be empowered by statute to "consider
a spouse's contributions to the development of a spouse's enhanced earning capacity in arriving at the equitable distribution of the remaining marital property and, in cases where it is
appropriate, . . . order maintenance that does not cease upon
remarriage." 296 To this end, several amendments to Domestic
297
Relations Law, section 236B, were recommended.
These proposals are intended to induce trial courts to replace enhanced earnings awards (as part of equitable distribution) with increased maintenance awards (crediting noneconomic career and career potential contributions). This effort
responds to the concern of those who oppose no-fault divorce for
fear that women - usually the less-monied gender - will con293. Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 215, at 66.
294. Id. The Report noted that a minority of the members favored retention of
the current method of disposition of enhanced earnings capacity. Id. at 66 n.57.
295. Id. at 66.
296. Id. The Commission observed that trial courts are currently authorized
to award maintenance in a form that is non-taxable to the spouse receiving the
payments and nondeductible to the spouse making the payments. Id.
297. The Commission proposed to amend DRL § 236B(5)(D)(6), which sets
forth the factors a court must consider in determining an equitable distribution of
the marital property, by adding language removing enhanced earning capacity as
an asset subject to division, but directing the court to "consider the direct or indirect contributions to the development during the marriage of the enhanced earning
capacity of the other spouse." Matrimonial Commission Report Appendices, at
App. L, available at http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/matrimonialcommissionAPPENDICES.pdf. In the statutory sections pertaining to maintenance, the Commission recommended amending DRL § 236B(6)(a)(8) by adding language authorizing
the trial court, "in considering the contributions to the career or career potential of
the other party," to award maintenance "payable for a period of time subsequent to
the remarriage of the party receiving the maintenance." Id. Finally, amendment
of DRL § 236(B)(6)(c) was proposed to make it clear that a court award of maintenance based upon such contributions to career or career enhancement may continue beyond the recipient spouse's remarriage. Id.
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tinue to be short-changed by divorce courts. 298 However, the
Commission's proposals may not sufficiently allay those concerns. A significant component of the rationale for eliminating
the treatment of enhanced earning capacity as an asset was-in
the Commission's
own words-the "speculative nature of its
'value."' 29 9 But the Commission's alternative is equally uncertain. By rejecting maintenance guidelines and suggesting only
that trial courts premise a maintenance award in part on a
spouse's contribution to the career and career potential of the
other spouse, the Commission's proposals are asking economically-disadvantaged spouses to take on faith what experience
has shown to be a legal system indisposed to redress the postdivorce imbalance.
Matrimonial law does not, of course, cause gender inequity.
And economic justice is not achievable entirely within divorce
law. 300 The Commission is to be credited for recognizing that
equitable distribution of marital property is generally inadequate to the task of re-balancing the spousal books at divorce.
On the issue of maintenance reform, the Commission contemplates a reappraisal and partial reversal of the 'clean break' notions from those heady days at the birth of modern no-fault
divorce. But the Commission's proposals fall far short of assuring that the divorce law protects "the justifiable expectations of
marriage partners ... based on marital commitment and dayto-day sharing."30 1 In sum, the prospects for achieving a true
no-fault divorce law in New York hinge on whether reforms of
maintenance go far enough. The Matrimonial Commission has
spoken. Now the political process will decide.
298. See text at notes 249-51 supra.
299. Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 215, at 66.
300. See Garrison, supra note 224, at 726 (footnote omitted):
[D]ivorce law should distribute the economic burden of divorce so as to protect wives who have been economically disadvantaged by long-term reliance
on the marital relationship. Divorce law should not, of course, be seen as a
primary strategy for correcting women's lack of economic equality. Even
though women's weaker economic position results in part from conflicts between career and family, marriage neither bears primary responsibility for
the problem, nor is divorce law capable of providing a cure.
Id.
301. Id.
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Conclusion
In the "twisting path"30 2 of New York divorce reform,
whether of grounds or economics, the notion of fault has made
an appearance at every bend of the road. That fault continues
to be featured is largely a product of the state's political and
moral traditions. It remains to be seen whether twenty-first
century New York will finally be able to let go of fault as a leveraging factor and envision a system of equity without
recrimination.

302. BLAKE, supra note 9, at 189.

